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INTRODUCTION: THE UNREALIZED 1992 SINGLE SECURitIES MARKEr

The Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundation for the European
Communities (EC) in 1958, was designed to remove all restrictions on the free
movement within the EC of goods, persons, services and capital.' This grand
plan was furthered by the European Commission White Paper of 1985, which set
forth a program for creating a single European market by 1992 which would be

* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Study of International Business Law, Brooklyn
Law School. Partner, Kelley Drye and Warren, New York. Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1977-80. B.A., Radcliffe College; LL.B., New York University. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the Eason-Weirnann Center for Comparative Law's
Colloquium in Heisinki, Finland on June 3-4, 1992. This article is dated August 31, 1992. A
Pulbright-Hays research grant and a summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School are
gratefully acknowledged for assistance in the preparation of this article. The research assistance of
Brooklyn Law School student Nina Kim was helpful and appreciated.
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TREATY EsTABUSHNO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNiTY

[EEC TREATY], art. 3(c).
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expanding and flexible, to ensure that resources, including capital and investment,
would flow into the areas of greatest economic advantage.2 It was envisioned
that national regulators would continue to play a supervisory role, but that
financial services would be liberalized by putting into effect EC-wide minmum
standards which would supersede former national regulations.3 A timetable for
the adoption of securities law directives was included in the White Paper.' The
White Paper was then implemented by the Single European Act amendments to
the Treaty of Rome, which encouraged and facilitated the use of directives to
harmiomze the laws of Member States.5
The objective of these efforts was to remove technical barriers, that
either added costs or restricted entry into particular markets, thereby impeding
the free movement of goods, services, (natural and legal) persons and capital.
This open internal market was intended to give consumers access to a wide range
of financial products, without regard to the country from which they were
provided, to make the financial services sector more competitive and capable of
utilizing economies of scale and to provide discipline in the conduct of economic
policies. A single financial market would serve to encourage rational investment
and allocation of savings throughout the EC. Further, the single market
envisioned would set up an attractive and competitive integrated financial system
for both EC and non-EC business circles.'
Nevertheless, it was recognized that there was a need for EC-wide
prudential rules to underpin the stability of the financial system and to provide
a satisfactory level of protection for consumers. The mechanism chosen for
integration of the financial markets was a series of directives that would
harmomze essential standards throughout the EC and enable financial regulators

2. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM (83) 310 final at 8 [hereinafter White Paper].
3. Id at 1103.
4. Id at Annex, 26-27.
5. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1005, 25 I.L.M. 506 [hereinafter SEA].
A directive is not a law, such as the Treaty of Rome, which directly applies to EC Member States
and supplants national law. Rather, the directive requires Member States to take such legal measures
as may be necessary in order to achieve and aim of the EC within a specified time. A directive is
not self-operating; it is more like a uniform law, that requires implementation by each Member State.
See, KLAus-DmTEr BORCHARDT, THE ABC oF COMMUNrTY LAw 27 (1990).
6. White Paper, supra note 2, at 1125-27.
7. 1992: Completion of the Single Market in FinancialServices, Commission of the European
Communities, I SECJB16J88, Oct. 10, 1988.
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to practice home country control, but oblige them to honor principles of mutual

recognition.
At the end of the first half of 1992, as the Presidency of the EC passed
from the Portuguese to the British, the single market program in financial
services was woefully behind schedule. Major directives were either languishing
from lack of interest or so controversial they could not go forward in a
meaningful form. Further, an ambitious private sector initiative to integrate the
securities markets had failed. This article will describe what progress had been
made on harmomzation of the securities laws in the EC by the middle of 1992
and then set out some theories on why greater harmomzation proved so difficult.
On a superficial level, public and private sector politics can be blamed
for the impasse in securities law harmomzation, but the political forces at work
have deep economic and historical legal roots. These forces are related to the
conflict between governmental centralization in Brussels and subsidiarity which
is at the heart of the debate over the Maastricht Treaty." However, certain
factors peculiar to the securities markets have made financial integration an
intractable problem. First, there are different systems of corporate finance in
different European countries which are difficult if not impossible to reconcile
without strong pressure from investors and such an investor constituency does
not yet exist in Europe. Second, securities regulation in Europe has developed
in an insular fashion. In some countries regulation has traditionally been
governmental, while in other countries it has been market based. At a time when
stock exchanges all over the world are engaged in a battle for survival resulting
from rapid technological changes, no one is deeply interested in experimenting
with new regulatory regimes.
Part H of tus article will describe the EC securities and company law
directives relevant to the creation of a single EC securities market. Part I will
describe competing European models for corporate finance and stock exchange
trading. Parts IV and V will analyze why some directives have passed but other
major proposed directives remain pending, perhaps for the indefinite future.
Finally, the author will suggest that a single EC securities market is unlikely to
be realized, regardless of the outcome of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,
until a powerful consumer group, such as institutional investors, demand
integration of the European capital markets.

8. See Mark Nelson, EC Summit to Mull Concept of Submdaiarity, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1992, at

B6.
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Financial services law encompasses, at a minimum, the law applicable to
public and private offerings of securities and the regulation of financial markets
and financial intermediaries. In the United States, banking, commodities and
insurance law are considered as disciplines separate from securities law, and this
article maintains that distinction, although portions of the Second Banking
Directive9 are relevant to understanding the progress of securities law
harmonization.
The United States also separates securities law, winch is primarily federal
law, from corporation law, winch is primarily state law. In Europe, corporation
or company law sinilarly is viewed as distinct from securities law, although
some harmonization of company law was also part of the 1992 program. There
is a serious question as to how far harmonization of securities law can proceed
without harmonization of company law because these two fields of law are both
complimentary and conflicting. Furthermore, the role and protection of
shareholders is very different in the United Kingdom than in continental Europe.
Company law and securities law come together in the area of takeover
regulation, winch was on the 1992 agenda for the single market, but about winch
there is little consensus.
The first step in creating a single market in fimancial services was the
liberalization of capital movements, permitting both individuals and firms the
freedom to invest capital anywhere in the EC; for example, the right to open a
bank account in any Member State." Although this freedom allows an investor
to take the initiative and approach suppliers of financial services, it does not
insure that the suppliers are free to establish and solicit business from potential
investors in every EC country. In order to create an EC-wide capital market that
would not unperil the stability of the fimancial system, the EC determined that
a level playing field should be established for financial suppliers and users; for
example, uniform rules for stock exchange membership or harmonized capital
adequacy requirements for banks and securities firms. A series of directives
eliminating technical barriers to cross-border securities offerings and trading was
therefore put forward.
There are four groups of financial law directives winch relate to the

9. Council Directive 89/646,1989 OJ. (L 386) 1,amendedby Council Comgenda of Mar. 30,1990,

1990 OJ. (C 42/06) 7.
10. This objective was accomplished by the adoption of the directive liberalizing controls on capital
movements. Council Directive 88/361, 1988 OJ. (L 178) 5.
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efforts to develop a single securities market m the EC. These groups consist of
directives on financial disclosure, directives covering public securities offerings
and stock exchange listings, directives regulating trading markets, and directives
regulating financial intermediaries. Another way to analyze the types of law
required to create a comprehensive scheme of securities regulation is to
determine what rights should be granted to and what obligations should be
mposed upon each of the three groups affected by securities laws: issuers
seeking capital, investors and financial intermediaries.
An important series of directives have been adopted setting forth
nmmunum standards for the protection of shareholders of all EC companies.
These directives also protect creditors, including bondholders and suppliers. For
the most part, these directives cover both public and private companies and
regulate financial disclosure and related matters. The First Directive on
Company Law" provides a system of publicity for all companies and requires
disclosure of information on their basic corporate documents, officers, and
balance sheet items, such as paid-up capital and profit and loss accounts. The
Second Directive on Company Law" applies only to public companies and
specifies minmum capital requirements, lays down certain restrictions on issued
share reacquisitions and provides for shareholder preemptive rights.
The Fourth Directive on Annual Accounts1 3 requires that annual financial
statements be published that give a "true and fair" view of a company's assets,
liabilities, financial position and profit and loss. Two formats for the balance
sheet and four formats for the profit and loss account are permitted. Guidelines
are provided for the presentation of standard nunimum footnote disclosure. The
Sixth Directive on Divisions 4 requires that certain types of restructuring be
approved at an annual meeting and affords shareholders informational and fair
treatment rights. The Seventh Directive on Consolidated Accounts "5 specifies
when accounts have to be consolidated and the procedures for doing so. The
Eighth Directive on Auditor Qualification 6 lays down minimum educational and
professional qualifications for auditors of public companies and provides that
auditors should be persons of good repute. The Eleventh Directive on Company

11. Council Directive 68/151, 1968 OJ. SpEc. ED. (L 65) 41.
12. Council Directive 77/91, 1977 OJ. (L 26) 1.
13. Council Directive 78/660, 1978 OJ. (L 222) i1.
14. Council Directive 821891, 1982 OJ. (L 378)) 47.
15. Council Directive 83/349, 1983 OJ. (L 193) 1.
16. Council Directive 84/253, 1984 OJ. (L 126) 20.
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Law" standardizes the information a Member State can require a local branch
of a foreign company to disclose so that branches of foreign companies can be
treated in the same manner as domestic branches.
One important directive m the field of company law has not been passed.
The Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive on Company Law" deals with the
structure of corporate boards and is lughly controversial. It was initially
proposed twenty years ago and could easily remain only a proposed directive into
the next century.
A second group of directives establishes standards for disclosure in public
offerings and listings of securities. The Admissions Directive 9 sets forth
minimum requirements for the admission of shares and debt securities on
Member State stock exchanges. The Listing Particulars Directive' requires
that, prior to being listed on a stock exchange, companies provide investors with
a prospectus containing all information necessary to make an informed
assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses and
prospects of the issuer and of the rights attaching to the securities. The Interim
Reports Directive21 imposes an ongoing requirement on stock exchange listed
companies to publish sem-annual profit and loss reports and developments of
significance to investors. The Public Offer Prospectus Directiven regulates
public offerings of transferable securities throughout the EC, either by the issuer
or selling shareholders. Specific items of information disclosure are mandated
and exemptions are provided for small issues and private placements.
These mrnum disclosure standards provide a foundation for imposing
an obligation on securities regulators to recognize the disclosure regulatory
standards of other EC Member States. An amendment to the Listing Particulars

17. Council Directive 89/666, 1989 OJ.(L 395) 36.
18. Amended Proposal for Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty
Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Compames and the Powers and Obligation of Their
Organs, 1983 OJ.(C 240) 2. A related effort is the proposed Statute for the creation of a European
company. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC on the Statute for a European
Company, 1991 OJ. (C 176) 1.
19. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 OJ. (L 66) 21, as amended by Council Directive 821148, 1982

03. (L 62) 22.
20. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 OJ. (L 100), amended by Council Directive 82/148 (L 62) 22,
and Council Directive 1990 OJ. (L 112) 24.
21. Council Directive 82/121, 1982 OJ. (L 48) 26.
22. Council Directive 89/298, 1989 OJ.(L 124) 8.
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Directives provides that EC Member States must recognize stock exchange
listing applications of issuers from other Member States without requiring
additional information, if an application filed simultaneously (or
contemporaneously) is approved by the issuer's home state. The Second Mutual
Recognition Directive2 provides for similar mutual recognition of any public
offer prospectus winch has been subject to scrutiny and approval by a competent
authority. The workings of these directives demonstrate the principles of
mmnmum standards, mutual recognition and home country control, that are basic
tenets of the single market in securities.
A third group of directives deals with securities trading. The Major
Shareholdings Directives requires disclosure to the issuer and to competent
authorities of significant acquisitions or dispositions of listed securities. The
Insider Dealing Directive 6 harmonizes the law on insider trading and requires
all Member States to adopt legislation to prohibit insider trading. Of possibly
more far reaching importance than either of these directives is the Proposed
Thirteenth Directive on Company Law" that would establish nummum
standards for the conduct of takeovers. This directive is extremely controversial
because it goes to the heart of corporate governance and therefore is unlikely to
move forward m the immediate future.
A fourth group of directives addresses the regulation of financial
intermediaries. The Second Banking Directive' establishes a legal framework
for a single banking market in the EC to begin on January 1, 1993. It provides
that a bank established and licensed in one EC Member State may provide
financial services throughout the EC without obtaining additional regulatory
approvals in other EC states. This right to establish branches in other EC
countries, and to market and sell services in any country directly, without being
required to obtain a license from the host country, is often referred to as the
single passport. Although banks are subject to home rather than host country
control, nummum capital adequacy and other standards are set forth in the

23. Council Directive 87/345, 1987 OJ. (L 185) 81.
24. Council Directive 90/211, 1990 OJ. (L 112) 24.
25. Council Directive 88/627, 1988 OJ. (L 348) 62.
26. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 OJ. (L 334) 30.
27. Amended Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover
and Other General Bids, 1990 OJ. (C 240) 7.
28. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1, amended by Council Corrgenda of Mar. 30,
1990, 1990 OJ. (C 42/06) 7.
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Second Banking Directive as a predicate for mutual recognition. The Second
Banking Directive is relevant to this article for two reasons. First, in some, but
not all European countries, banks are stock exchange members and dominate the
securities industries. Second, the Second Banking Directive is a model for a
single passport for securities houses, that thus far has not been achieved.
The UCITs DirectiveP sets forth nummum standards for what
Americans call mutual funds and what Europeans call Undertakings for
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities. The effect of the directive is
that any closed-end investment fund witlun an EC Member State that complies
with EC minimum standards and has been duly authorized by the appropriate
home country regulator can be freely marketed throughout the EC without prior
authorization of the host country. The proposed Investment Services Directive 3
would establish a single passport for securities firms, but has long been bogged
down in controversies concerning what, if any, minmum standards for regulation
of stock exchanges and securities intermediaries should be a predicate for such
mutual recognition. The related proposed Capital Adequacy Directive31 would
establish financial responsibility requirements for securities firms.
Mi.

CoMPETIG MODELS OF CoRPoRAEm FINANCE

The individual EC Member States have developed very different forms
of public company and stock exchange organization. These differences can be
attributed to a variety of economc, political and cultural forces. Of paramount
importance is the role of the public securities markets, with the stockholder as
a legal surrogate, in funding and ordering business, as contrasted with the role
of either banks or the government. Also relevant is how the tension between
capital and labor'is resolved.
In the United Kingdom, directors manage corporations essentially for the
benefit of shareholders.32 Although recent legislation has imposed a duty upon

29. Council Directive 88/220, 1988 OJ. (L 100) 31.
30. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services m the Securities Field,
1989 OJ. (C 43) 7 [hereinafier Investment Services Directive].
31. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Commission Proposal for a Council Directive

on Capital Adequacy of Investment Fims and Credit Institutions, 1990 OJ. (C 152) 6. Capital
Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, 1990 OJ. (C 152) 6.
32. Percival v. Wright, 71 Ch. 846 (1902); Hutton v. West Cork Railway Company, 23 Ch.D. 654,
671 (Ch. Div'l Ct. 1883). See generally, P.A.1. Brown, The Role of Independent Directors in
Corporate Governance, 56 NOTRE DAME L REV. 936 (1981).
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directors to employees of the firm," labor-management tensions are resolved
through collective bargaining rather than within the firm's corporate governance
structure. The public securities markets are a significant factor m the funding
and ordering of financial structures.' Institutional investors, including pension
funds, are an important force m the stock market."
Under the German system of co-determination, employees are represented
on the supervisory board of the corporation and have as great a claim to
corporate profits as shareholders. Commercial banks are major shareholders of
the most important public companies, so lenders, rather than shareholders, take
the lead in allocating capital.'
Hostile takeovers are rare." Institutional
investors are not very significant.' The corporate governance system in the
Netherlands is similar to that of Germany, but institutional investors play an
influential role in the equity market."
In France, the government is significantly involved in corporate finance.
Companies frequently are fimanced by affiliated compames as well as by
banks.4 Individual share ownership has been encouraged in recent years, both
directly and through collective investment funds. A new shareholder protection
regime has gone hand in hand with a policy of privatization of government
enterprises.41 Other so called "Club Med" countries, such as Italy and Spain,

33. Companies Act, 1985, 1 309 (Eng.).

34. Jeffrey R. Kmght, Reform and Change in the. EuropeanStock Exchanges, in THIRD PHnm0oz
JEEEEBHOY MEMORIAL LECTURE, Dec. 4, 1991, at 33. See JULAN WALMSLEY, GLOBAL INVEsTING
223-30 (Macilliam Press Ltd. 1991).

35. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative
Perspective,57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991). See also Victoria Younghusband & Ian Wilson,
UnitedKingdom, In INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 227 (Joseph C.F. Luflan & David
Gallagher eds., 1990).
36. 4 RicHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPr, LEGAL HARMONATON mD THE BusINEss
ENTERPRisE 181-82 (1988); JANEr DwmE, E.C. CoMPAY LAw § 8.3 (1991); New Dreams at
Deutsche Bank, EcONoMisT, June 22, 1991, at 79.

37. Hermann H. Kalifuss, The American Corporationand the Institutional Investor: Are There
Lessonsfrom Abroad? The German Erperience,3 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 775, 784 (1988).
38. Buxbaurn, supra note 35, at 13-14.
39. Gils van Leeuwen, The Netherlands,in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 171,171-76
(Joseph C.F. Luflan & David Gallagher eds., 1990).
40. See Coum

RANDLESOME, BUSINESS CULTuREs IN EUROPE 60, 80 (1990).

41. See John J. Duffy, Are Banks Ready for French Revolution?, AM. BANxn., Apr. 20, 1987, at 1;
French Stock Market Reform; Big Bang Encore, EcoNoMIsT, Sept. 14, 1991, at 90.
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have similarly organized econormes. 42
The stock exchanges n Europe also have different characteristics. In the
United Kingdom, the stock exchange is an important part of the economic and
financial fabric of the country. There is a strong tradition of self-regulation and
a respect for free market forces.4 The London Stock Exchange is a quote
driven market and off-exchange trading is possible. Umversal banking is
permitted." The Netherlands and Denmark adhere to tius model, except that
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange has a unique trading system, which is order
driven and employs a specialist (called a hoekmnan) to establish trading prices.'
In Germany, the stock exchanges have long been dominated by the banks,
which engage in off-exchange trading. The equity markets are decentralized and
relatively weak. 4 Since exchange members are almost exclusively banks, they
are regulated as such. Tins model also prevails in Luxembourg! 7
In contrast to both the United Kingdom and Germany, the Napoleomc
model is one of institutional rigidity. All orders must be brought to the stock
exchange and an official price is set once a day by a designated stock exchange
broker." In France, Italy and Spam until very recently, this official was
appointed by the government.49 In these countries, banks may own stock
brokerages, but they cannot become direct stock exchange members.'
The legal systems of the United Kingdom and the continental countries
are also at odds. In the United Kingdom there is a common law system m which
a significant portion of company and securities law is based on judicially
developed theories of fiduciary duty. The British strongly prefer financial self-

42. RANDLEsoME, supra note 40, at 107-08, 133-35, 238-39.
43. Knight, supra note 34, at 33.
44. See Five Years Since Big Bang; After the Earthquake,ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 23.
45. Jorgen Gronborg, Denmark, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOvERNANcE, 81, 86-87 (Joseph
C.F. Lufkin & David Gallagher eds., 1990); Government Delays Securities TransactionSupervision
Act, INT'L SEc. REO. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 5 (Mar. 24, 1992). Amsterdam generally is considered
the first stock exchange; shares m the Dutch East India Company were traded there. See FiwDiNmND
BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF CoMMmcia 100-106 (1979).
46. WALMS.EY, supra note 34, at 244-46.
47. Knight, supra note 34, at 32-33.
48. Id. at 32.
49. See La grande boum, EcONOMIsT, Oct. 11, 1988, at 83; FarReaching Changeson the Bolsa,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1992, at B6.
50. Rooma D. HUANO & HANS R. STou., MAJOR WORLD EQuiTY MARKErS: CURRENT STRUCTURE
AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 30 (1991).
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regulation to statutory regulation, viewing the latter as insufficiently flexible."1
On the Continent, a civil law system covers company law and securities law, and
financial regulation proceeds from theory to actuality. Perhaps too much is made
of this distinction, since the Germans also favor self-regulation and the United
Kingdom in recent years has developed a detailed statutory regime to regulate
the securities industry.'
There also is a wide range of models for governmental agencies
regulating the securities industry. This has become an important issue m the
nplementation of EC directives, because a competent authority to supervise
particular activities, for example the review of prospectuses, must be designated
when national laws are passed. In countries with a strong self-regulatory
tradition, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, stock
exchanges have been designated as competent authorities and they act pursuant
to delegated governmental power.53 In France, Italy, Spam and Portugal,
independent agencies have been created to oversee securities activities and
mtermedianes s In Belgium, a new agency supervises both banking and
securities.'5 In Germany, there is no federal securities supervisory authority.
For this reason, among others, the Insider Trading Directive has not yet been
implemented.'
Indeed, one of the most important consequences of EC
securities law harmonization has been the creation of new securities regulators.
However, since countries have responded so differently to implementation of the
enacted directives, this proliferation of administrative agencies may impede rather
than facilitate future progress toward the adoption of EC-wide standards.
Finally, the problems of language and culture should be mentioned. All
EC documents must be produced in the language of each Member State, although
negotiations could be more expeditiously conducted m one language. However,

51. BUXBAUM & HoP'r, supra note 36, at 190.
52. See Charles Abrains, The U.K FinancialServicesAct 1986, REV. FIN. SERv. REa., June 3, 1987,
at 101. See generally Berhard Grossfeld, The Internal Dynamics of European Community Law, 25
INT'L LAw. 124 (1992), for an argument that the EC is moving U.K. law closer to continental law.
53. InternationalEquity Offers, International Orgamzation of Securities Commissions 21-22 (1989).
54. IM at 22; Francesco Corsi, Recent Developments In Italian CorporateLaw, in JutIDIFICATION
OF SOCIAL SPHERES 273, 278, 284-85 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
55. BUXBAUM & Hoir, supra note 36, at 189.
56. See David Waller & Katharine Campbell, Germans Callfor Tougher Rules, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
20, 1991, at 24; Finance Ministry Releases Plans to Revamp Securities Laws; Exchanges Reach
Agreement, INT'L SEC. REaO. REP. (BNA) at I (Jan. 27, 1992).
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language itself is traditionally a very political matter in Europe.' Also, while
the northern countries generally are less enthusiastic about Europe as an
organizational ideal than the southern countries, they are quicker and more
conscientious about implementing directives. 5 Furthermore, business cultures

and the education of business leaders differs from country to country, which
impedes the development of a European business culture.?
IV

CoMMENs ON THE ADopTm DinvEs

Implementation of the disclosure and accounting directives appears to
have had only a minor effect on financial disclosure by world class compames.
Very generally, the accounting directives bring accounting standards throughout

Europe up to the more rigorous standards previously followed only in countries
such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, world class issuers

were already listed in London or on other major stock exchangesw Moreover,
the EC directives still allow considerable choice, so that EC accounting principles
cannot be considered up to an international standard."1 Finally, the EC
directives did not regulate the use of huge hidden reserves by German and some

other continental companies, which means that the financial statements of issuers
of different countries, or even within the same country, are not necessarily
comparable.'
Hidden reserves enable compames to utilize their cash flows for

self-financing without the need to tap public securities markets. They also lower

57. Existing logistical difficulties will increase if the EC admits more numbers. See On the Way to
the Forum, EcoNomrsT, July 11, 1992, at 14.
58. See Andrew Kennon, The Single Market- A Legislative Perspective,13 COMPANY LAWYER 25,
30-31 (1992).
59. See Lucy Kelaway & Tim Dickson, Painful Birth of Single Market,FIN. TMEs, Dec. 19, 1990,
at 16; The Business of Europe, EcONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1991, at 63.
60. It has been estimated that 40% of the trading volume m many major European stocks takes place
on SEAQ International m London. Richard B. Rustin, London Spawns Market of the Future -for
Big Players,WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at Cl, C9.
61. See Bob Hagerty, DifferingAccounting Rules Snarl Europe, WAL ST. J., Sept 4, 1992, at A4;
David Waller, Bringing Harmony to the Babel of Community Accounting Languages, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 6.
62. Jonathan Fuerbrnger, World Market; S.EC. Says No on German Stocks, N.Y. Tms, Apr. 26,
1992, at 15; See David Waller, Germans DrawLine at Two Sets ofAccounts, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1992, at 33. See also, Ali the World's a Ratio, ECoNoMIsT, Feb. 22, 1992 at 72.
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taxes. Because accounting for tax purposes and financial disclosure purposes
is identical in some countries, such as Germany and Italy, but not in others, such
as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, it is difficult to develop
market-oriented international accounting standards.' Also, the EC directives
on auditor qualifications did not set forth independence standards for auditors.'
The directives did make a difference at the edges, particularly with regard
to consolidation principles.' Also, they had a significant impact on privately
owned companies that heretofore had no obligation to publicly report their assets
or earnings. The disclosure and accounting directives will prove at least as
helpful to bank lenders, and even to trade creditors, as they will to
M
shareholders."
This may have been a critical factor in the political
compromises that were reached regarding these directives. The directives
probably will facilitate economc integration within Europe, and they may
prepare privately held companies in countries like Italy for future public
offerings, but their immediate impact on the financial disclosure practices of
listed companies has been mnmmal.
The mutual recognition provisions of the listing particulars and public
offer directives held out more promise of creating a single market in securities
and generally improving fimancial disclosure. This has not happened, however,
due to the rivalries and suspicions of the European stock exchanges, which will
be discussed more fully in connection with the Investment Services Directive.'
It should be noted that the mutual recognition provisions are very narrow; they
only come into play in the instance of simultaneous or virtually simultaneous
listing applications. There is no obligation for a stock exchange in one country
to list an issuer because it is listed on an exchange in another EC Member State.
The Eurolist project of the Federation of Stock Exchanges in the EC would result
in this type of reciprocity, but the future of that project is uncertamin8

63. Andy Simmonds & Olivier Azieres, Accountingfor Europe-Success by 2000 A.D.? ToUcHE
Ross EUR. SEiv. UPDATE 8-11, 44 (May 1989).
64. This was left to the decision making of each Member State. Council Directive 84/253, 1984 OJ.

(L 126) 20.
65. See Simmonds & Azieres, supra note 63, at 45.
66. Tlus is probably appropnate since the purpose of the hannonization is to remove bamers to the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, not specifically to protect shareholders.
67. Investment Services Directive, supra note 30. See ifra notes 85-98 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the proposed directive.
68. See EC Stock ExchangesShould be Linked, Not Merged FederationOfficial Says, [Jan.-June]
SEc. REo. & L REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 1004 (June 28, 1991).
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Two of the adopted directives have the potential to be meaningful m the
future. The UCITs Directive, which is m the process of being implemented,
could create large cross-border investment funds which will lead to more
efficient capital allocation. The managers of these funds may demand better
financial disclosure and greater shareholder rights from European companies.
The creation of large private pension funds in France and Italy, where there is
serious government interest in supplementing retirement savings this way, could
similarly lead to the development of a constituency favoring investor interests.'
The Insider Trading Directive may also prove a force for greater
disclosure. If insiders are prohibited from trading on the basis of information
known to them, but not publicly available, a system of continuous disclosure may
develop more rapidly. In countries where banks are major shareholders of public
corporations, the prohibitions against trading on inside information could change
marketplace dynamics. It is difficult to understand how material information,
such as the amount of a company's hidden reserves, will continue to be withheld
from the market if this information is known to insiders.
V

COMMENTS ON THE STALLED DirwmEms

A.

Company and Takeover Law

Under corporate governance theories prevailing in the United Kingdom,
shareholder interests are paramount. Shareholders are regarded as owners of the
enterprise?0 Labor relations are adversarial.7 A board of directors owes a
fiduciary duty to creditors only if a company is approaching insolvency. By
contrast, large public corporations in continental states all have some degree of

69. In both France and Italy, pensions are funded on a pay as you go system. With an aging
population, such financing is infeasible and accordingly plans are being made for the creation of
funded pensions. Alice Rawsthorn, Re-engineering the Paris Stock Market: A New Wave of Changes
to French Securities Rules, FIN. TnMEs, Mar. 24, 1992, at 23; Houdint Meets His Match, ECONOMIST,
July 18, 1992, at 73.
70. PETER XxERmB, THE Roirs oF SHAREHOLDERS 10-11 (1989).
71. David Marsh, Competing with Germany; A Hard Actfor Britain to Follow, FiN. TvMEs, Apr. 15,
1991, at 14.
72. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd., 1983
Ch. 258, 288 (C.A. 1983); Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (Eng.).
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worker participation embedded in their corporate governance structures. 3 In
Germany and the Netherlands, there are two-tier boards and employees are
Companies are not run
formally represented on the supervisory board.'
primarily for the benefit of shareholders. Workers and other constituencies, such
as creditors, also have a stake in a company's fortunes. Labor relations is not
a separate branch of law, but a part of company law. This view of the firm
stresses the continuity of the enterpnse.7"
These differences in perspective not only make for significant
discrepancies in the company law of different EC Member States, but also create
very different legal and business environments for hostile takeovers. Hostile
takeovers are common in London and they are regulated by the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers, a self-regulatory body winch operates pursuant to the
City Code on Takeover and Mergers (City Code)." The two most important
principles in the City Code are that the shareholder of an offeree company must
decide whether or not an offer should succeed, and that all equity holders must
be treated equally.' In addition, after an offer is commuicated to the board,
or even if a board has reason to believe an offer is imminent, the offeree board
is prohibited from taking any action without the approval of shareholders at a
general meeting "winch could effectively result in any bona fide offer being
frustrated or in the shareholders being denied the opportunity to decide on its
merits."'
On the Continent, hostile takeovers can occur, but they are not actively

73. Demitns Constas, The Developing European Community Law of Worker Participation in
Management, II INT'L LAw & POL 93 (1978).
74. Fnednch KL Kubler, InstitutionalOwners and CorporateManagers: A German Dilemma, 57
BROOL L REV. 97, 98 (1991); JJ.M. Maeijer, Dutch Law Relating to Hostile Takeovers and the
ProtectionAgainst Them, in DEFENSIVE MEASURES AoAINST HOSTILE TAKEovmts INTim COMMON
MARE 173, 190-95 (J.M.M. Maeijer & K. Geens eds., 1990).
75. See BUXBAUM & HOLT, supra note 36, at 177-81; MJ.G.C. Raaijmakers, European
Harmonization: Quo Vadis?, in HARMONiZATmoN OF COMPANY AND SEcurriEs LAw 64, 83-84
(1989).
76. See Jonathan Brayne, Tender Offers Involving U.K Companies, 21 REV. SEc. & CoMM. REo.,
67, 70 (Apr. 27, 1988).
77. Simon MacLachlan &William MackesyAcquisitionsofCompames in Europe - Practicability,
Disclosure,and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAw. 373, 387-88 (1989).
78. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Gen. Prmc. 7 (Eng.).
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encouraged by governmental policy or by financial institutios. 9 Numerous
legal barriers to takeovers of a wide variety are permitted, although the types of
barriers that are lawful and popular vary from county to county.'
In view of these very different perspectives on the role of management
and directors, it is not surprising that both the proposed Fifth Directive on
Company Law and the proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers are
controversial. The proposed Fifth Directive would mandate some form of worker
participation in corporate governance; an anathema m the United Kingdom.' 1
It also would, among other things, prohibit limitations on voting rights by large
shareholders, and otherwise abrogate certain antitakeover devices.' Instead of
serving to set up a viable political trade off, these pro-worker and proshareholder provisions have generated opposition from industrial companies
everywhere.
The proposed Takeover Directive is similarly opposed both in the United
Kingdom and on the Continent. Although modeled on the U.K. scheme of
regulation and designed to protect shareholders, it would substitute a statutory
regulatory system for a self-regulatory system. There are provisions for a
mandatory bid once a threshold position of one-third of the voting shares are
acquired. Also, all holders of an offeree company who are in the same position
must be treated equally and the board of an offeree company is required to act
in the interests of all shareholders by not frustrating the bid.' Although similar
concepts are being introduced into French law, other continental countries are
disinclined to leave their national corporations vulnerable to hostile takeovers by
foreigners.'4
In order to overcome the antagonism wlch the proposed Company Law
and Takeover Directives have generated, a strong countervailing investor

79. See COOPERS & LYBRAND,U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, I BARRIERS TO TAKEOVER
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY §§ 1.5 - 1.6, at 2 (1989).
80. Id. §§ 2.29 - 2.35 at 22-24.
81. See John Gapper, Fowler Attacks EC's Proposal to Enforce Worker Involvement, FIN. TlmS,
Oct. 23, 1989, at 12.
82. See Stephame Cooke, Lowering the Barrers to Euromergers, INSTrnTIONAL INVESToR, Apr.
1990, at 61; Obstacles to Hostile Bids Are A Target of New EC Strategy, [Jan.-June] SEc REo. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 909 (June 15, 1990).
83. 1989 oJ.(C 64) 8.
84. See Takeover Directive Stalled; States Opt for Own Legislation, INT'L SEc. REo. REP. (BNA)
at 2 (Jan. 27, 1992); Dutch Firms Warned on Takeover Exposure un a New Environment, INT's SEc.
REO. REP., at 3 (Dec. 17, 1990).
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constituency would be required. However, non-bank institutional investors in
Europe are neither sufficiently large nor activist to counteract business managers
and the banks, as major lenders, are unlikely to back measures wiuch might
destabililize company financial structures.
B.

The Investment Services Directive

The Investment Services Directive was intended to provide a single
passport for non-baniang financial institutions to provide investment services
throughout the EC. In addition, the Investment Services Directive was supposed
to have been the vehicle for achieving the need, as perceived in the 1985 White
Paper, to create a European securities market system based on EC stock
exchange trading. The White Paper expressed the view that electronically linked
stock exchanges creating a Community-wide trading system would substantially
increase the depth and liquidity of EC stock markets, and ensure their
satisfactory operation in the best interests of investors.,O
Euroquote, a private sector initiative of the Federation of Stock
Exchanges in the EC, would have created such a pan-European stock market.'
However, the British viewed such an electronic exchange as a threat to SEAQ
International, a trading system of the London Stock Exchange, and refused to
finance it. As a result of the United Kingdom's opposition, the Germans also
backed out of the project.' Eurolist, a much less ambitious project wuch
merely facilitates the listing of world-class issuers on several EC stock
exchanges, was substituted as a political compronse."
The rival forces that destroyed Euroquote were then deployed to debates
over the Investment Services Directive, which became stalemated. In order to
understand these battles, it is necessary to understand the differences between
SEAQ International and the continental stock exchanges. It is also necessary to
appreciate that countries with universal banking, like Germany, where
commercial and investment banking are conducted within a single entity, already

85. White Paper, supra note 2, at 107.
86. See Richard Walters, PipeBnngs Dream ofEuro-bourseCloser to Realty, FIN. TIEs, Apr. 19,
1990, at 36; Plugging Into a Pan-EuropeanStock Market, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1990, at 81.
87. See Richard Walters, Bourses Battle for Prideof Place In Europe,FIN. TIME, May 17, 1990,
at 25; Brussels Babble, ECONoMISt, June 1, 1991, at 76.
88. Walters, supra note 87, at 26.
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have a single passport to establish business in any EC country." The only issue
of importance to such universal banks is whether they can join stock exchanges.
SEAQ International is a screen-based quote-driven trading system that
functions as an off-shore wholesale market in equity securities. It claims to
handle up to half of the trading volume in big French and Italian equities and up
to a third of the volume in big German stocks.' The continental exchanges, on
the other hand, are order-driven and function as retail markets. In Germany offexchange trading is permitted, but in France, Italy and other countries all orders
are required to be brought to the stock exchange for execution' Both quotedriven and order-driven markets have fervent supporters. Combining the two
types of trading systems in a single market is technically and philosophically
dfficut.92
The initial draft of the Investment Services Directive embodied the
principle of a single passport for securities houses, but had minimal provisions
for the regulation of securities markets or intermedianes
The French then
came forward with amendments attempting to achieve minnum standards as to
publication of trade information, off-exchange trading and access to stock
exchange membership by banks." Tins led to a North-South split, with the
United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands arguing for latitude in the
publication of trade information (to suit SEAQ International market makers),
permission to engage in off-exchange trading (urged by the London Stock
Exchange and the universal banks) and bank access to stock exchanges (of great
importance to the German banks). France, Italy and Spam, more interested in
protecting their national brokers and retail investors, fought for prompt public
reporting of trade information, the prohibition of off-exchange trading and the
restriction of stock exchange membership to securities firms (which could be
bank subsidiaries). Although a political compronse was reached on these issues

89. See Michael Uruson & Wolfgang Fuenng, The New Banking Law of the European Economic
Community, 25 INT'L LAW. 1 (1991).
90. The Battle of the Bourses, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1992, at 81.
91. See Setting Europe's Stockmarkets Free, ECONOMsT, Sept. 7, 1991, at 18.
92. See FIBV Workshop Addresses Issue of Secondary market Disclosure, INT'L SEC. RnO. REP.
(BNA), at 5 (July 17, 1992); Market Focus; Last Orders?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1992, at 91.
93. Home country control was the rule. Capital adequacy was m a companion directive. See
Maiory Appel, EEC-1992 and the Securities Industry, SEC. & ComM. REa. (Standard & Poor), Apr.
11, 1990, at 67.
94. See Andrew Hill, Investment Services Reach Stalemate in Brussels, FiN. TRIES, Mar. 15, 1991,
at 29; Struggling Through the Wire, ECoNoMIST, Aug. 3, 1991, at 69.
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during the last days of the Portuguese Presidency, it is unclear what shape an EC
directive will take that is capable of practical implementation." A compromise
on capital adequacy provisions was reached m conjunction with the decision to
go forward with the Investment Services Directive.'
Stock exchanges all over the world are in the throes of change and
modermization. Automation and internationalization have made traditional ways
of trading stocks obsolete. Business efforts to integrate the European exchanges
through a common quote system have failed and it is unlikely that EC law will
be able to succeed in creating a European stock market.' While EC directives
can remove barriers to competition and integration, it.is much more difficult for
the law to mandate ideal market place models."
VI.

CONCLUSION

Financial regulation is generally slow and difficult. Such regulation
necessarily strikes a balance between competition to promote efficiency and
regulation to protect investors and to prevent systemic risks to financial
institutions. Therefore, it is easy to stall reform. Perceived national self interest
has made the achievement of a single market for European securities easier to
debate than to achieve. Moreover, powerful special interest groups stand to lose
more than they may gain by improved efficiency in the capital markets. What
in the United States is sometimes viewed as a conflict between Wall Street and
Main Street has international overtones in the EC. The financial community is
interested in light regulation and the United Kingdom is interested in preserving
London's status as a financial center.
Continental company managers fear threats to their hegemony from a
market oriented corporate finance system, especially a system which encourages
hostile takeovers. Stock exchanges have become fierce competitors and many

95. See EuropeanFinancialServices; Delayed Harmony, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 68.
96. See FinanceMinistersReach AccordSetting Rulesfor SecuritiesBrokers, [July-Dec.] SEc. REo
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 1004 (July 3, 1992).
97. See Richard Walters & George Graham, Birth of a Market Needs Burial of Differences, FIN.
TIMS, Nov. 28, 1990, at 25; Richard Walters, Bourses Build Up Defenses, FIN. TIMs, Sept. 24,
1991, at 25; InternationalEquities: Trading Places, EcoNoMIST, Jan. 11, 1992, at 78.
98. Many of these same problems surfaced m the United States with regard to unplementation of
the national market system mandated by the 1975 amendments to the federal securities law. See
Milton H. Cohen, The NationalMarket System - A Modest Proposal,46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 743
(1978).
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question their survival, especially regional continental exchanges. The London
Stock Exchange is viewed as an unfair competitor because the regulation of
SEAQ International is more lax than the regulation of domestic equity trading.
Moreover, it has the characteristics of a derivative market.
The current impasse over the Company Law and Takeover Directives is
unlikely to be broken unless some important business sector demands action. An
Investment Services Directive is likely to be so riddled by political compromises
that it will set no standards for stock exchange trading. The development of an
institutional investor group of collective investment trusts and pension funds is
the most likely constituency for securities law harmiomzation in Europe. At this
time, however, investor activism in Europe is only inchoate.

